This reverts commit 0f100a6e94, which
introduced a hack to possibly wait with a PDU session setup at the RRC
in case a RRC UE capability transaction (requesting UE capabilities from
a UE) was ongoing. This happened, as we delayed the UE capabilities to
after the first RRC reconfiguration; in that case, certain UEs were
requesting the next PDU session, and if RRC did not delay the new PDU
session (as requested from the core), this procedure might occur while
UE capability enquiry was ongoing, leading to failures in these
transactions.
The default RRC reconfiguration was previously sent after the security
mode command as a "first" RRC reconfiguration. However, it is simply not
needed, as it will be triggered through a subsequent reconfiguration
that also sets up DRBs.
Move the Measurement Config to the "other/dedicated" RRC
reconfiguration.
This reconfiguration would have forwarded a NAS PDU (typically a
registration accept). This is now done by a dedicated forwarding of NAS.
This reverts commit 4a7d7975ce.
Trigger the UE capability right after security mode complete, as
specified in O-RAN WG5.C.1-v11. Also, there is no "need" for the
"default" RRC Reconfiguration (it will come once PDU sessions are
requested), so remove this as well.
Previously, the CU sent the Security Mode Command as part of a UE
context setup request. This was done "because it was possible", not
because there was an inherent need to do this. However the LiteOn DU
does not like this, as it expects to also have a DRB in the UE context
setup request procedure, which is not always the case.
Hence, send the Security Mode Command in a normal DL RRC msg transfer
over F1. As of this commit, there is not UE context Setup Request (so it
might not work with all DUs), but the OAI DU is cool and does not care,
so RFsim still works.
This also aligns the CU's behavior with O-RAN.WG5.C.1-v11.
Finally, as of this commit, we do not trigger a UE context setup
request, so we cannot handle PDU sessions inside the initial UE context
setup request at the same time as the security mode command (which was
done previously before reaching this point). This will be fixed in a
later commit.
In the DU, read slice information from the DU config file. Handle
multiple slices within the F1 Setup Request structure representation,
and forward it via F1 to CU. The DU slice information is stored in the
setup request structure.
This reverts commit eaf28414ca.
This assertion was introduced as we (wrongfully) thought we needed to
calculate the SSB ARFCN at the CU. Since PBCH might carry one bit, which
is not available at the CU, only certain SSB ARFCNs would have been
possible.
With the availability of the SSB ARFCN through the
MeasurementTimingConfiguration, this is not necessary anymore.
MeasTimingConfig may not come with F1 Setup Request: some DUs send it
with the DU configuration update. Handle this gracefully by checking for
MTC before using it.
Use the correct MIB data structure, MIB_t. This is required by 38.473,
and the LiteOn DU sends only that. So our CU needs to handle it, so
align the OAI DU as well.
- according to 5.3.7.4 of TS 38.331: 1> re-establish RLC for SRB1;
- gNB:
1) re-establish RLC for SRB1 in nr_rlc_update_id
2) re-establish RLC for remaining RBs concurrently with RRCReconfiguration
issue: gNB) in nr_rlc_update_id the gNB is re-establishing RLC for all
RBs at the same time when receiving RRCReestablishmentRequest
from UE
UE) according to the specs, the UE is re-establishing RLC for
SRB1 with RRCReestablishmentRequest the other RBs are
re-established during RRCReconfiguration (in our case in
nr_rrc_ue_process_RadioBearerConfig) when receiving
reestablishRLC IE in rlc_BearerToAddModList
RLC TX) this leads to RLC counters mismatch after re-establishment:
control PDUs discarded until max nb of retx is reached
and then UL failure occurs
The main work of this commit is to rewrite cipher_aes_128_cbc_cmac()
which was too slow and created issues when running the 4G eNB on some
machines (LLL when using a b210).
Instead of creating the security context, use it, and delete it, all in
cipher_aes_128_cbc_cmac(), we introduce the function init_aes_128_cbc_cmac()
to create it, and we change cipher_aes_128_cbc_cmac() to just use it,
and we also adapt free_aes_128_cbc_cmac(). The function aes_128_cbc_cmac()
is removed, it does not follow the new init/use/free API.
Doing so, on the primary test machine used to do this work (a powerful
and fast machine where it is possible to set the CPUs' frequencies)
it was possible to limit the CPUs' frequencies to 500 MHz (it was not
possible to go lower) without any LLL (using a b210, quectel UE in
idle, no data traffic, only periodic measurement reports). Before this
commit, it was necessary to set a frequency of at least 1.8 GHz
otherwise some LLL would appear.
Then we need to adapt the rest of the code to take into account those
changes.
A notion of security container (stream_security_container_t) containing
ciphering and integrity contexts is introduced.
And the code is harmonized for, hopefully, better readability.
The (opaque) type stream_security_context_t is introduced, used by
both integrity and ciphering contexts. The idea is to use a
init()/use()/free() API for all the security procedures, identical for
all the ciphering and integrity procedures.
Robert Schmidt