The main work of this commit is to rewrite cipher_aes_128_cbc_cmac()
which was too slow and created issues when running the 4G eNB on some
machines (LLL when using a b210).
Instead of creating the security context, use it, and delete it, all in
cipher_aes_128_cbc_cmac(), we introduce the function init_aes_128_cbc_cmac()
to create it, and we change cipher_aes_128_cbc_cmac() to just use it,
and we also adapt free_aes_128_cbc_cmac(). The function aes_128_cbc_cmac()
is removed, it does not follow the new init/use/free API.
Doing so, on the primary test machine used to do this work (a powerful
and fast machine where it is possible to set the CPUs' frequencies)
it was possible to limit the CPUs' frequencies to 500 MHz (it was not
possible to go lower) without any LLL (using a b210, quectel UE in
idle, no data traffic, only periodic measurement reports). Before this
commit, it was necessary to set a frequency of at least 1.8 GHz
otherwise some LLL would appear.
Then we need to adapt the rest of the code to take into account those
changes.
A notion of security container (stream_security_container_t) containing
ciphering and integrity contexts is introduced.
And the code is harmonized for, hopefully, better readability.
The (opaque) type stream_security_context_t is introduced, used by
both integrity and ciphering contexts. The idea is to use a
init()/use()/free() API for all the security procedures, identical for
all the ciphering and integrity procedures.
remove several unused files
remove mem_block_t that is never used in a different way than a simple heap buffer
move up IP address type and remove duplications of the same struct declaration
OAI is riddled with boolean_t, FALSE, TRUE, etc. This makes no sense, as
there is a standard bool type, and could lead to nasty bugs if a
definition of a bool is non-standard (0 == false, true == !false). This
commit removes all non-standard bools in the whole project.
Instead of NULL RAND value check, added the flag to indicate if the
AUTH process started. The flag is used manage the timer handling
for authentication process when stored RAND values is same as received
RAND value in AUTH_REQ.
It was observed in simulation test the OAI UE always sends the sucessful
AUTH_RES when the AUTH_REQ has the RAND value "0". This opens a back door
in the authentication process.
The code is modified to fix this issue in OAI UE.
NAS triggered the Kenb Refresh Req always for (hardcoded) UE 0. This
fixes this by setting the correct UE ID.
An effect of this was that the Kenb would always be set for UE 0,
regardless for which UE it was actually intended. This led for integrity
check failures for every UE with ID > 0.
- print current working directory
- print git version (if available)
- print security keys
this last one is a security breach, but as of today
it's not a problem
Cedric Roux