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x2ap: bugfixes Store UE Capability at target, Key derivation (keNB star) at source

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This commit is contained in:
Konstantinos Alexandris
2019-03-05 14:22:40 +01:00
committed by Cedric Roux
parent eb59c2cd68
commit ca19953200
3 changed files with 53 additions and 33 deletions
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openair2/RRC/LTE/rrc_eNB.c
+49 -29
View File
@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ extern uint16_t two_tier_hexagonal_cellIds[7];
mui_t rrc_eNB_mui = 0;
extern uint32_t to_earfcn_DL(int eutra_bandP, uint32_t dl_CarrierFreq, uint32_t bw);
extern int rrc_eNB_process_security(const protocol_ctxt_t *const ctxt_pP, rrc_eNB_ue_context_t *const ue_context_pP, security_capabilities_t *security_capabilities_pP);
extern void process_eNB_security_key (const protocol_ctxt_t *const ctxt_pP, rrc_eNB_ue_context_t *const ue_context_pP, uint8_t *security_key_pP);
extern int derive_keNB_star(const uint8_t *kenb_32, const uint16_t pci, const uint32_t earfcn_dl, const bool is_rel8_only, uint8_t * kenb_star);
void
openair_rrc_on(
@@ -3800,6 +3803,9 @@ rrc_eNB_process_MeasurementReport(
int neighboring_cells=-1;
int ncell_index = 0;
long ncell_max = -150;
uint32_t earfcn_dl;
uint8_t KeNB_star[32] = { 0 };
T(T_ENB_RRC_MEASUREMENT_REPORT, T_INT(ctxt_pP->module_id), T_INT(ctxt_pP->frame),
T_INT(ctxt_pP->subframe), T_INT(ctxt_pP->rnti));
@@ -3929,9 +3935,11 @@ rrc_eNB_process_MeasurementReport(
// Don't know how to get this ID?
X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).mme_ue_s1ap_id = ue_context_pP->ue_context.mme_ue_s1ap_id;
X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).security_capabilities = ue_context_pP->ue_context.security_capabilities;
memcpy (X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).kenb,
ue_context_pP->ue_context.kenb,
32);
// compute keNB*
earfcn_dl = (uint32_t)to_earfcn_DL(RC.rrc[ctxt_pP->module_id]->carrier[0].eutra_band, RC.rrc[ctxt_pP->module_id]->carrier[0].dl_CarrierFreq,
RC.rrc[ctxt_pP->module_id]->carrier[0].N_RB_DL);
derive_keNB_star(ue_context_pP->ue_context.kenb, X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).target_physCellId, earfcn_dl, true, KeNB_star);
memcpy(X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).kenb, KeNB_star, 32);
X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).kenb_ncc = ue_context_pP->ue_context.kenb_ncc;
//X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).ue_ambr=ue_context_pP->ue_context.ue_ambr;
X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).nb_e_rabs_tobesetup = ue_context_pP->ue_context.setup_e_rabs;
@@ -4078,9 +4086,9 @@ void rrc_eNB_process_handoverPreparationInformation(int mod_id, x2ap_handover_re
int rnti = taus() & 0xffff;
int i;
//global_rnti = rnti;
//HandoverPreparationInformation_t *ho = NULL;
//HandoverPreparationInformation_r8_IEs_t *ho_info;
//asn_dec_rval_t dec_rval;
LTE_HandoverPreparationInformation_t *ho = NULL;
LTE_HandoverPreparationInformation_r8_IEs_t *ho_info;
asn_dec_rval_t dec_rval;
ue_context_target_p = rrc_eNB_get_ue_context(RC.rrc[mod_id], rnti);
if (ue_context_target_p != NULL) {
@@ -4114,16 +4122,20 @@ void rrc_eNB_process_handoverPreparationInformation(int mod_id, x2ap_handover_re
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.kenb_ncc = m->kenb_ncc;
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.security_capabilities.encryption_algorithms = m->security_capabilities.encryption_algorithms;
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.security_capabilities.integrity_algorithms = m->security_capabilities.integrity_algorithms;
/*
dec_rval = uper_decode(NULL,
&asn_DEF_HandoverPreparationInformation,
&asn_DEF_LTE_HandoverPreparationInformation,
(void **)&ho,
m->rrc_buffer,
m->rrc_buffer_size, 0, 0);
if ( LOG_DEBUGFLAG(DEBUG_ASN1) ) {
xer_fprint(stdout, &asn_DEF_LTE_HandoverPreparationInformation, ho);
}
if (dec_rval.code != RC_OK ||
ho->criticalExtensions.present != HandoverPreparationInformation__criticalExtensions_PR_c1 ||
ho->criticalExtensions.choice.c1.present != HandoverPreparationInformation__criticalExtensions__c1_PR_handoverPreparationInformation_r8) {
ho->criticalExtensions.present != LTE_HandoverPreparationInformation__criticalExtensions_PR_c1 ||
ho->criticalExtensions.choice.c1.present != LTE_HandoverPreparationInformation__criticalExtensions__c1_PR_handoverPreparationInformation_r8) {
LOG_E(RRC, "could not decode Handover Preparation\n");
abort();
}
@@ -4132,13 +4144,13 @@ void rrc_eNB_process_handoverPreparationInformation(int mod_id, x2ap_handover_re
if (ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability) {
LOG_I(RRC, "freeing old UE capabilities for UE %x\n", rnti);
ASN_STRUCT_FREE(asn_DEF_UE_EUTRA_Capability,
ASN_STRUCT_FREE(asn_DEF_LTE_UE_EUTRA_Capability,
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability);
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability = 0;
}
dec_rval = uper_decode(NULL,
&asn_DEF_UE_EUTRA_Capability,
&asn_DEF_LTE_UE_EUTRA_Capability,
(void **)&ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability,
ho_info->ue_RadioAccessCapabilityInfo.list.array[0]->ueCapabilityRAT_Container.buf,
ho_info->ue_RadioAccessCapabilityInfo.list.array[0]->ueCapabilityRAT_Container.size, 0, 0);
@@ -4146,16 +4158,16 @@ void rrc_eNB_process_handoverPreparationInformation(int mod_id, x2ap_handover_re
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability_size = ho_info->ue_RadioAccessCapabilityInfo.list.array[0]->ueCapabilityRAT_Container.size;
if ( LOG_DEBUGFLAG(DEBUG_ASN1) ) {
xer_fprint(stdout, &asn_DEF_UE_EUTRA_Capability, ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability);
xer_fprint(stdout, &asn_DEF_LTE_UE_EUTRA_Capability, ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability);
}
if ((dec_rval.code != RC_OK) && (dec_rval.consumed == 0)) {
LOG_E(RRC, "Failed to decode UE capabilities (%zu bytes)\n", dec_rval.consumed);
ASN_STRUCT_FREE(asn_DEF_UE_EUTRA_Capability,
ASN_STRUCT_FREE(asn_DEF_LTE_UE_EUTRA_Capability,
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability);
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.UE_Capability = 0;
}
*/
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.nb_of_e_rabs = m->nb_e_rabs_tobesetup;
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.setup_e_rabs = m->nb_e_rabs_tobesetup;
ue_context_target_p->ue_context.mme_ue_s1ap_id = m->mme_ue_s1ap_id;
@@ -4239,7 +4251,6 @@ check_handovers(
)
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
{
int result;
struct rrc_eNB_ue_context_s *ue_context_p;
RB_FOREACH(ue_context_p, rrc_ue_tree_s, &(RC.rrc[ctxt_pP->module_id]->rrc_ue_head)) {
ctxt_pP->rnti = ue_context_p->ue_id_rnti;
@@ -4256,19 +4267,15 @@ check_handovers(
LOG_I(RRC,
"[eNB %d] Frame %d : Logical Channel UL-DCCH, processing RRCHandoverPreparationInformation, sending RRCConnectionReconfiguration to UE %d \n",
ctxt_pP->module_id, ctxt_pP->frame, ue_context_p->ue_context.rnti);
result = pdcp_data_req(ctxt_pP,
SRB_FLAG_YES,
DCCH,
rrc_eNB_mui++,
SDU_CONFIRM_NO,
ue_context_p->ue_context.handover_info->size,
ue_context_p->ue_context.handover_info->buf,
PDCP_TRANSMISSION_MODE_CONTROL
#if (LTE_RRC_VERSION >= MAKE_VERSION(14, 0, 0))
,NULL, NULL
#endif
);
AssertFatal(result == TRUE, "PDCP data request failed!\n");
rrc_data_req(
ctxt_pP,
DCCH,
rrc_eNB_mui++,
SDU_CONFIRM_NO,
ue_context_p->ue_context.handover_info->size,
ue_context_p->ue_context.handover_info->buf,
PDCP_TRANSMISSION_MODE_CONTROL);
ue_context_p->ue_context.handover_info->state = HO_COMPLETE;
LOG_I(RRC, "RRC Sends RRCConnectionReconfiguration to UE %d at frame %d and subframe %d \n", ue_context_p->ue_context.rnti, ctxt_pP->frame,ctxt_pP->subframe);
}
@@ -5306,6 +5313,19 @@ rrc_eNB_configure_rbs_handover(struct rrc_eNB_ue_context_s *ue_context_p, protoc
, 0, 0
#endif
);
rrc_eNB_process_security (
ctxt_pP,
ue_context_p,
&ue_context_p->ue_context.security_capabilities);
process_eNB_security_key (
ctxt_pP,
ue_context_p,
ue_context_p->ue_context.kenb);
rrc_pdcp_config_security(
ctxt_pP,
ue_context_p,
FALSE);
// Add a new user (called during the HO procedure)
LOG_I(RRC, "rrc_eNB_target_add_ue_handover module_id %d rnti %d\n", ctxt_pP->module_id, ctxt_pP->rnti);
// Configure MAC for the target
openair2/RRC/LTE/rrc_eNB_S1AP.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static e_LTE_SecurityAlgorithmConfig__integrityProtAlgorithm rrc_eNB_select_inte
*\param security_capabilities The security capabilities received from S1AP.
*\return TRUE if at least one algorithm has been changed else FALSE.
*/
static int
int
rrc_eNB_process_security(
const protocol_ctxt_t *const ctxt_pP,
rrc_eNB_ue_context_t *const ue_context_pP,
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ rrc_eNB_process_security(
*\param security_key_pP The security key received from S1AP.
*/
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void process_eNB_security_key (
void process_eNB_security_key (
const protocol_ctxt_t *const ctxt_pP,
rrc_eNB_ue_context_t *const ue_context_pP,
uint8_t *security_key_pP
openair2/X2AP/x2ap_eNB_handler.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -671,8 +671,8 @@ int x2ap_eNB_handle_handover_preparation (instance_t instance,
if (c->size > 1024 /* TODO: this is the size of rrc_buffer in struct x2ap_handover_req_ack_s*/)
{ printf("%s:%d: fatal: buffer too big\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); abort(); }
memcpy(X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ_ACK(msg).rrc_buffer, c->buf, c->size);
X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ_ACK(msg).rrc_buffer_size = c->size;
memcpy(X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).rrc_buffer, c->buf, c->size);
X2AP_HANDOVER_REQ(msg).rrc_buffer_size = c->size;
itti_send_msg_to_task(TASK_RRC_ENB, x2ap_eNB_data->x2ap_eNB_instance->instance, msg);