-fsanitize=address detected that we were trying to access bytes
past the end of a block of malloc'ed memory.
Specifically, in this code:
```
} else if (ENB_NAS_USE_TUN) {
if( LOG_DEBUGFLAG(DEBUG_PDCP) )
log_dump(PDCP, pdcpData, sizeToWrite, LOG_DUMP_CHAR,"PDCP
output to be sent to TUN interface: \n");
ret = write(nas_sock_fd[0], pdcpData, sizeToWrite);
```
-fsanitize=address said:
```
==80==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address
0x61100004ffdc at pc 0x7f57c5f576a5 bp 0x7f57bb53c240 sp
0x7f57bb53b9e8
READ of size 108 at 0x61100004ffdc thread T7
0x61100004ffdc is located 0 bytes to the right of 220-byte region
[0x61100004ff00,0x61100004ffdc)
```
So, the code was trying to access the first byte after a block of
heap memory.
sizeToWrite was calculated like this:
```
int sizeToWrite= sizeof (pdcp_data_ind_header_t) +
pdcpHead->data_size;
```
There were a few other similar invocations of write() in the same
function used the wrong size. That sizeToWrite calculation
should be used only when the header is being sent, too, which
happens in only one place in this function.
With this commit, our tests pass and -fsanitize=address is happy.
The global mbms_rab_id was defined as `uint16_t` in
eNB_scheduler_mch.c but `int` in other places. So, code that
wrotes this global would clobber the two bytes that follow the
variable in memory.
Found by `-fsanitize=address`.
For some reason the htons invocation got deleted which broke
the VNF P7 interface.
Also fixed some build issues, not sure how these got onto the
develop branch to begin with.
Removing references to memcpy_dl_config_req and
memcpy_tx_req because these functions are leaking
memory. For our standalone mode we have created
new/modified memcpy_dl/tx_req functions.
1) Only count new transmission as scheduled bytes (which is then
compared against the BSR)
2) When subtracting scheduled bytes after successful reception, subtract
TBsize from correct HARQ process
The code is forced to use nea2, no matter what the UE supports.
After 2^18 PDCP packets, it will fail to work (we don't use HFN yet).
These limitations will be fixed in later commits.
The existing security function was not reused, because it does too
much memory allocation and initializes the security context at each
ciphering. So here comes nr_pdcp_security_nea2_cipher(). And also
the ciphering is done inplace. To be changed if necessary.
More accurately, we changed the do/while infinite
loop to be an infinite for loop for the read command of
the socket. The socket file descriptor choice is more clear now.
* add the RA process to handle to command parameters
* Do not create the RAR_pdu into an intermediate array, but directly
into the nFAPI TX_req
* Slightly restructure nr_generate_Msg2() to first make AssertFatal()
checks, then proceed allocating
More accurately, we changed the do/while infinite
loop to be an infinite for loop for the read command of
the socket. The socket file descriptor choice is more clear now.
As the precedent commit, this commit deals with the realtime problems
that we currently have on the CI bench.
For DL HARQ feedback, nFAPI does not give us the HARQ process ID.
Instead, we have to figure this out "from timing", i.e., if we trigger
PUCCH reception, we will get a message with HARQ if we instructed the
PHY to do so. If we have real-time problems, it seems (I cannot verify:
don't have real time problems) that we do not get the nFAPI message with
HARQ feedback. Thus, we need to skip the HARQ processes that should have
been processed in the past, which happens in this commit.
At the time of this commit, the CI has realtime issues. This can mean
that the HARQ result is delivered in a delayed fashion. Before this
commit, we were asserting on whether the slot corresponds to the HARQ
process's expected feedback slot, but a particular feedback might be
delayed under realtime issues, and we actually don't care about the
timing since we get the HARQ process ID.
Instead, we loop through the HARQ processes for which we wait for a
feedback in the beginning until we have the right process (which did not
seem to cause a problem till now, but who knows.
Michael Cook