A UE might send a UE Capability Information without unsolicitatedly
(intentionally or not). Check this and handle appropriately to avoid
assertion
Assertion (UE->xids[xid] == RRC_UECAPABILITY_ENQUIRY) failed!
In handle_ueCapabilityInformation() ../../../openair2/RRC/NR/rrc_gNB.c
Closes: #858
A UE might send a rrcReestablishmentComplete without the actual IEs
present (intentionally or not). Check this and handle appropriately to
avoid assertion
Assertion (reestablishment_complete->criticalExtensions.present == NR_RRCReestablishmentComplete__criticalExtensions_PR_rrcReestablishmentComplete) failed!
In handle_rrcReestablishmentComplete() ../../../openair2/RRC/NR/rrc_gNB.c:1364
Closes: #854
Prior to this commit, if we receive an Initial Context Setup Request for
a UE that has AS security set up, the gNB asserts with
Assertion (!ue_p->as_security_active) failed!
In rrc_gNB_generate_SecurityModeCommand() openairinterface5g/openair2/RRC/NR/rrc_gNB.c:2590
logic error: security already activ
However, TS 38.413 says:
> The AMF may initiate the Initial Context Setup procedure if a
> UE-associated logical NG-connection exists for the UE
(I interpret this as "it might happen anytime")
> store the received Security Key in the UE context and, if the NG-RAN
> node is required to activate security for the UE, take this security key
> into use.
(I interpret this as "do not set up AS security again")
In this commit, handle if we receive an Initial Context Setup Request
for an existing UE context. As said in the spec, we store the keys. If
security is not active, we trigger RRC Security Mode Command. If it is
active, we skip Security, and directly set up a PDU session. If there is
also no PDU session, we simply forward the NAS message, and acknowledge.
If there was no AS security, after security, the gNB would trigger the
setup of PDU sessions (if any), and then forward any NAS PDUs, which is
stated in the if block if AS security is already active.
rrc_gNB_process_security() does not only set (process) the security
algorithms, but also checks for those. However, we don't use the check.
Simplify the function, to reintroduce the check later. Rename to
set_UE_security_algos() to better reflect what the functions do.
3GPP 38.331: If absent, the UE applies the SCS as derived from the prach-ConfigurationIndex in RACH-ConfigGeneric (see tables Table 6.3.3.1-1, Table 6.3.3.1-2, Table 6.3.3.2-2 and Table 6.3.3.2-3, TS 38.211 [16]).
This procedure for msg1_SubcarrierSpacing NULL is not implemented, so we aplly the same value of UL SCS.
Resolve error:
nfapi/oai_integration/aerial/fapi_nvIPC.h:56:16: error: unknown type name ‘nvipc_params_t’
56 | int nvIPC_Init(nvipc_params_t nvipc_params_s);
By including the header. Also, move the definiton of the struct to the
MAC, where it is actually stored, and out of the radio common_lib.h,
since this is not a radio (split 7/8) parameter.
These functions look up the numerology, and code can be harmonized:
- ssb_index_from_prach()
- find_SSB_and_RO_available()
- schedule_nr_prach()
The next commits also need to look up the numerology from the
UplinkConfigCommon. This provides the common implementation to be used
in follow-up commits.
the code creates a sink to read all traced packets and drop it. but
this works only if we send to a local address and if there is not
another sink (like if we trace both UE and gNB in the same machine).
this sink's purpose is only to prevent to get automatic packets back
from the kernel saying "no listener". So, instead of killing the trace
when we can't create the sink (as done previously), we now just let the
trace in operation.
Robert Schmidt